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FOREWORD: THE SUPREME COURT’S
SHADOW DOCKET
William Baude*
ABSTRACT
The 2013 Supreme Court Term provides an occasion
to look beyond the Court’s merits cases to the Court’s
shadow docket — a range of orders and summary decisions that defy its normal procedural regularity.
I make two claims: First, many of the orders lack the
transparency that we have come to appreciate in its merits cases. Some of those orders merit more explanation,

* Neubauer Family Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Thanks to Judith Miller for helpful conversations in the course of conceiving this
piece, and to Josh Chafetz, Nathan Chapman, Justin Driver, Roy Englert, Jeff Fisher,
Chad Flanders, Dina Mishra, Erin Murphy, Zach Price, Richard Re, and Mark
Shawhan for subsequent comments on it. Further thanks to Nickolas Card for excellent research assistance and the Alumni Faculty Fund and SNR Denton Fund for
research support. Finally, thanks as well to friends and readers at the Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com, where some of my thoughts on these topics first appeared.
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and should make us skeptical of proposals to depersonalize the Court.
Second, I address summary reversal orders in particular. As a general matter, the summary reversal has become a regular part of the Supreme Court’s practice. But
the selection of cases for summary reversal remains a
mystery. This mystery makes it difficult to tell whether
the Court’s selections are fair.
I catalogue the Roberts Court’s summary reversals
and suggest that they can be grouped into two main categories — a majority that are designed to enforce the
Court’s supremacy over recalcitrant lower courts, and a
minority that are more akin to ad hoc exercises of prerogative, or “lightning bolts.” The majority, the supremacy-enforcing ones, could be rendered fairer through
identification of areas where lower-court willfulness
currently goes unaddressed. We may simply be stuck
with the lightning bolts.
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I. BEYOND THE MERITS CASES
We saw another side of the Supreme Court this
year. As the Court left town for the summer, observers
noted that the term’s cases were not as dramatic or farreaching as in previous years.1 Indeed, the biggest termender, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, was not even a constitutional case.2 The view that the Term’s merits cases were
a fizzle rather than a bang provides an occasion to examine the rest of the Court’s work.3
Outside of the merits cases, the Court issued a number of noteworthy rulings which merit more scrutiny
than they have gotten. In important cases, it granted
stays and injunctions that were both debatable and mysterious. The Court has not explained their legal basis

1 E.g., Adam Liptak, Compromise at the Supreme Court Veils Its Rifts, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2014) at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/us/supreme-court-termmarked-by-unanimous-decisions.html (“[t]he term lacked huge and profoundly
divisive cases like those that ended the last two terms.”). See also Laurence H. Tribe,
It Wasn’t a Pivotal Year, but the Wind Blows Conservative, SLATE (July 1, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2
014/ scotus_roundup/supreme_court_2014_a_year_of_uncertainty.html.
2 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). By my estimation,
the last term of which that was true was OT 2008’s culmination in Ricci v. DeStefano,
557 U.S. 557 (2009).
3 Like Fred Schauer did in his 2005 foreword, “I depart from the expectations of
the Foreword genre, one in which all Terms are more important than average.” Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agenda - and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 64
(2006).
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and it is not even clear to what extent individual Justices
agree with those decisions.
It has also continued its long-debated practice of
summary reversal of lower-court decisions. Those summary reversals have become more transparent and procedurally regular over time, but this Term’s developments should prompt a more careful examination of
which cases are selected for summary reversal and why.
Why, for example, do pro-government habeas cases so
dominate the summary reversal docket? Are there not a
similar number of civil rights cases in need of correction
in the opposite direction?
This Foreword examines both these aspects of the
Court’s docket, and argues that they deserve attention
and possibly reform. People criticize the Court’s merits
cases for being political, unprincipled, or opaque. But
those criticisms may be targeted at the wrong part of the
Court’s docket. It is the non-merits work that should
most raise questions of consistency and transparency.
That said, I should emphasize that my ultimate normative assessments are modest and tentative. I do not
cast my lot with those who think that the Court’s work
is all politics rather than law, who demand term limits
for the Justices, or who think it important that the Court
televise its proceedings or publish more of its internal
work-product.
My point is just that the Court’s non-merits orders
do not always live up to the high standards of procedur-
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al regularity set by its merits cases, and that it may be
possible for its performance to be improved. Even if it
cannot be, a better understanding of the orders list
should make us skeptical of some efforts to reform the
Court’s merits processes.
Only a few weeks into the 2014 Term, the orders list
remains front-and-center, with high-profile inactivity in
the same-sex marriage cases, 4 and divided decisions
about stays in a range of cases.5 As the orders list comes
to new prominence, understanding the Court requires
us to understand its non-merits work — its shadow
docket.
A. THIS YEAR’S ORDERS
The orders list is not the hottest topic in Supreme
Court scholarship. Every year, various journals publish

4 Robert Barnes, The Supreme Court’s Actions Are Monumental, But the Why of Its
Reasoning
Often
Missing,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
12,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-courts-actions-aremonumental-but-the-why-of-its-reasoning-often-missing/2014/10/12/ca1ccc9c4fca-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_story.html; Adam Liptak, Justices Drawing Lines With
Terse
Orders
in
Big
Cases,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
27,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/us/supreme-court-with-terse-orders-hasjudges-and-lawyers-reading-tea-leaves.html?_r=0.
5 See, e.g., Order, Veasey v. Perry, No. 14A393 (Oct. 18, 2014); Order, Frank v.
Walker, No. 14A352 (Oct. 9, 2014); Order, North Carolina v. League of Women Voters, No. 14A358 (Oct. 8, 2014).
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symposia and special issues devoted to the Supreme
Court. The vast majority of the pieces published in those
fora are about the opinions in the merits cases.6 The merits cases are at the center of the Court’s regular sessions,
which generally start at 10 a.m. and feature regular oral
arguments as well as the announcement of opinions in a
public ceremony.
The orders list issues without ceremony, half an
hour earlier. And until two years ago, the orders list was
even more overshadowed by the merits activity, because
it issued at the same time, but again without ceremony.7
Now it at least gets a 30-minute head start.
The most frequent orders are those granting or denying certiorari.8 But they are not the only ones, and the
2013 Term brought a surfeit of others. One of the Court’s
last merits opinions was its much-discussed Hobby Lobby

6 See, e.g., John Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 1284 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (2014); and each piece in this volume. I should note that the same could be
said about my prior work. See William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage After Windsor, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 150 (2013); William Baude, Sharing the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 39 (2014) (responding to Manning,
supra this note).
7 Press Release, Supreme Court, Regularly Scheduled Order Lists (Sept. 24, 2012)
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_09-24-12. There
are also irregular orders that issue as needed.
8 The certiorari process has received some scholarly attention. See, e.g., Kathryn A.
Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2011); Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There A Place for Certification?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1310 (2010).
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decision, which concerned a claim for religious exemption from a federal mandate to provide contraception. A
few days later, the orders list contained a related dispute, this time about the procedures required to take
advantage of the exemption. That second case, brought
by Wheaton College, featured a lengthy dissent by Justice Sotomayor (and joined by two other Justices) which
accused the Court of contradicting its own decision in
Hobby Lobby — “undermin[ing] confidence in this institution”—and, more prosaically, of improperly using the
All Writs Act.9
The immediate precedent for the ruling was also an
orders list episode. In Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius,
the Court had granted a temporary injunction to another
religious institution that had similar procedural objections.10 Justice Sotomayor herself granted Little Sisters a
temporary stay on New Year’s Eve,11 (just before she led
the countdown for the ball-drop in Times Square). A
longer stay was granted by the whole Court in late January. In her Wheaton College dissent, Justice Sotomayor

Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2808 (2014).
134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014).
11 134 S. Ct. 893 (2013). Technically, “the disposition of applications to Justices in
chambers without opinion are not listed in the Supreme Court’s orders list,” Daniel
M. Gonen, Judging in Chambers: The Powers of A Single Justice of the Supreme Court, 76
U. CIN. L. REV. 1159, 1226 (2008), but they are part of the non-merits docket.
9

10
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objected that the “unusual order” in Little Sisters was
distinguishable, and also seemed skeptical about its
merits.12
The orders list also featured repeated litigation about
whether to temporarily pause lower-court decisions that
authorized same-sex marriage. In Herbert v. Kitchen, the
Supreme Court stayed a federal ruling in Utah while it
was on appeal. 13 A stay was granted in another Utah
case in late June.14
Those orders were controversial but important. In an
insightful opinion in one case pending in the Ninth Circuit, Judge Andrew Hurwitz wrote that while his own
view of the procedural requirements would not have
justified a stay, the Supreme Court’s order in Kitchen
“virtually instructed courts of appeals to grant stays in
the circumstances before us today.”15 He concluded:

Although the Supreme Court’s terse two-sentence
order did not offer a statement of reasons … and
although the Supreme Court’s order in Herbert is

Wheaton College, 134 S. Ct. at 2815..
134 S. Ct. 893 (2014).
14 Herbert v. Evans, No. 14A65, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4715 (July 18, 2014).
15 Latta v. Otter, No, 14-35420, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16057, at *15 (9th Cir. May 20,
2014) (order granting stay and expediting briefing).
12
13
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not in the strictest sense precedential, it provides
a clear message — the Court (without noted dissent) decided that district court injunctions
against the application of laws forbidding samesex unions should be stayed at the request of state
authorities pending court of appeals review.16
But other courts refused to stay their orders until the
Supreme Court stepped in once again. 17 None of the
Court’s orders contained any explanation.
The lack of explanation was compounded when
the Court then denied certiorari in all of these cases at
the end of the summer. The Court almost never provides
explanation for the denial of certiorari, but one would
have guessed that the stays were premised on the probability that the Court would take up the issue. So something unusual was going on, but we don’t know what.
In November, Justice Thomas expressed puzzlement
about the issue too — or feigned it? — noting dryly that

Id.
See Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, No. 141167 (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2014); McQuigg v. Bostic, 14A196, 2014 WL 4096232 (U.S.
Aug. 20, 2014) (motion to stay mandate denied).
16
17
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the Court had declined to review the marriage cases “for
reasons that escape me.”18
On the more macabre side, the orders list also features the Court’s routine encounters with the “machinery of death.”19 The Court regularly receives last-minute
filings debating whether a pending execution should be
stayed.20 This year, the results made headlines after Joseph Wood spent nearly two hours seemingly gasping
for air before ultimately dying from lethal injection. 21
The execution happened because of a Supreme Court
order, which vacated a stay that had been imposed by
the Ninth Circuit over internal dissent.22
While it is unclear at the time of this writing what
precisely happened in the Wood execution, the Supreme
Court’s order bestowed a gruesome prescience upon an

18 Maricopa County v. Lopez-Valenzuela, No. 14A493, 2014 WL 5878739, at *2
(Nov. 13, 2014) (Thomas, J, respecting the denial of a stay).
19 The phrase was made famous on the orders list — by Justice Blackmun’s dissent from denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (“From
this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.”). The phrase
also appears in Rumbaugh v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919, 920 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
20 See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO, KENNETH S. GELLER, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP, EDWARD A.
HARTNETT, & DAN HIMMELFARB, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 351 n.108 (10th ed. 2013)
(describing this process).
21 Fernando Sanchez & John Schwartz, A Prolonged Execution in Arizona Leads to a
Temporary Halt, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2014) at A16, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/us/a-prolonged-execution-in-arizona-leadsto-a-temporary-halt.html?_r=0.
22 Ryan v. Wood, 189 L. Ed. 2d 873 (2014).
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opinion by Chief Judge Kozinski dissenting in the proceedings below. Kozinski had argued that lethal injections were a “misguided effort to mask the brutality of
executions” and that firing squads(!) ought to be reinstituted instead: “Sure, firing squads can be messy, but if
we are willing to carry out executions, we should not
shield ourselves from the reality that we are shedding
human blood.”23
The list could go on. Just for instance: At the start of
the term, the Court ordered the parties to show up to
argument prepared to discuss a specific, named, amicus
brief.24 During the summer the Court also opened an inquiry into a capital defense lawyer accused of filing a
certiorari petition without the authorization of, or over
the objection of, his putative client.25 And just a week
before the official end of the 2013 term, the Court issued

23 Wood v. Ryan, 759 F. 3d 1076, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting
from the denial of hearing en banc). Cf. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE
L. J. 1601, 1609 (1986) (“The judges deal pain and death”).
24 Atl. Marine v. U.S Dist. Ct., 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (“Motion of Professor Stephen
E. Sachs for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided
argument denied. Parties, however, should be prepared to address at oral argument
the arguments raised in the brief of Professor Stephen E. Sachs as amicus curiae in
support of neither party.”).
25 Ballard v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 2842 (2014) (denying certiorari to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania); Ballard v. Pennsylvania, No. 13-9364, 2014 WL
3891551 (U.S. Aug. 11, 2014).
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a divided 5-4 stay authorizing the state of Ohio to reduce the days available for early voting.26
B. PROCEDURAL REGULARITY
None of these orders is necessarily wrong, but they
raise questions of procedural regularity—i.e., of the consistency and transparency of the Court’s processes.
The Court’s procedural regularity is at its high point
when it deals with the merits cases. Observers know in
advance what cases the Supreme Court will decide, and
they know how and when the parties and others can be
heard. We know what the voting rule is; we know that
the results of the voting rule will be explained in a reasoned written opinion; and we know that each Justice
will either agree with it or explain his or her disagreement.27
Indeed, procedural regularity begets substantive legitimacy. The Court is subject to accusations that it is

Husted v. Ohio NAACP, No. 14A336 2014 WL 4809069 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2014).
While there are occasional charges that the Court cuts corners in the end-ofterm rush, the opinions are still dozens of pages long and have been in progress for
months.
26
27
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excessively political,28 but lawyers and the public nonetheless treat its decisions as uniquely conclusive. 29 A
sense that its processes are consistent and transparent
makes it easier to accept the results of those processes,
win or lose.30
The Court’s procedural regularity may even facilitate
its air of mystery. While the Court follows regular processes to produce public and reasoned opinions, its internal deliberations are afforded far more secrecy than
the other two branches. It also resists televising even its
public proceedings, and individual nominees and Justices regularly refuse to disclose their views on important
issues. Perhaps this mystery is tolerated in part because
of the Court’s regularity; we know that like clockwork
the Court will eventually provide us with a lineup and
extensive reasoning for both sides of its disputed cases.
Indeed, perhaps the Court’s authority is enhanced by
having this mystery funneled through its regular processes.31

28 E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT (2014); ERIC
SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND ITS
JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES (2012).
29 Cf. William Baude, Jurisdiction and Constitutional Crisis, 64 FLA. L. REV. F. 47
(2012).
30 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 106-109 (2d ed. 2006).
31 Thanks to Josh Chafetz for raising the points in this paragraph. For skepticism
about the legitimating value of Supreme Court opinions, see Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1395, 1398 (2000).
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But the orders process, by contrast, is sometimes ad
hoc or unexplained. For an instance of the ad hoc, consider the device of singling out an amicus brief for specific discussion at oral argument. One can imagine sensible reasons for making this a regular practice. The
Court jealously guards oral argument time and rarely
allows non-governmental interlopers.32 As amicus briefs
proliferate, the parties may not be ready for probing
questions about all of them. So such an order provides a
device for the Court to make oral argument more productive without having to allow amicus argument.
Perhaps, then, it should be used more often, and
perhaps not just for amici. Surely there are a lot of cases
where oral argument would be more productive if the
Court instructed the parties to come prepared to discuss
specific issues that weren’t adequately briefed.33 And yet
it is easy to see how this practice would create complications of its own — how would the Justices decide what
issues to list? What would happen when they disagreed?
And would the listing practice encourage strategic behavior at the expense of the quasi-spontaneity that
makes oral argument valuable? The Court does not

32 See SUP. CT. R. 28.7 (“Such a motion will be granted only in the most extraordinary circumstances.”); SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 781-783.
33 See Daniel Bussell, Opinions First — Argument Afterwards, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1194,
1233 n.118 (2014) (discussing use of such instructions by some appellate courts).
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seem to have resolved these concerns in either direction,
so the one-off order seems ad hoc.
As for the inexplicable: The lack of explanation for
the Wheaton College injunction and the same-sex marriage stays was more consequential. On one hand, they
seem to have been motivated by a common-sense desire
to preserve the status quo. But the Court has rules for
these things, and it is not easy to tell how they permitted
these orders. For instance, in her Wheaton College dissent,
Justice Sotomayor pointed out that members of the majority had previously written that an injunction could
issue only if the plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief was “indisputably clear.” 34 The majority seemed to reject this
standard by protesting that its “order should not be construed as an expression of the Court’s views on the merits,”35 but did not explain more. The Court issued a fourparagraph unsigned opinion that left the legal standard
and its legal basis a mystery.36

34 Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2810 n.3 (2014) (discussing Lux v.
Rodrigues, 561 U.S. 1306, 1307 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); & Ohio Citizens for
Responsible Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U.S. 1312, 1313 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers)).
35 Wheaton College, 134 S. Ct. at 2807; Justice Scalia concurred only in the result and
hence the disclaimer cannot be attributed to him.
36 Richard Re raises the intriguing possibility that “the Court may have implicitly
narrowed the scope of the ‘indisputably clear’ standard, so that—going forward—it
will apply only to decisions issued by individual justices acting in chambers. Supporting this possibility, some of the in-chambers opinions emphasize the enormity of
allowing a single justice to issue an injunction, so perhaps the Court felt that it could
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With respect to the same-sex marriage stays, I have
briefly touched on the mystery about granting the stays
and then denying certiorari. Even putting that aside,
what was the irreparable harm suffered by the state in
the absence of a stay, if marriages were provisionally
recognized over the summer? Was the theory that the
state might have been required to recognize the marriages permanently, even if it had prevailed? Or did the
Court as a whole intend to finally endorse the categorical claim that “any time a State is enjoined by a court
from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of
its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury”37? That
quotation had appeared in two prior stays entered by
single Justices, where it was not dispositive. Its one other appearance was in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion
in a 5-4 dispute earlier in the 2013 term over the propriety of a stay arising out of a new Texas abortion law; in

apply a lower standard once the application had been referred to the entire Court. If
this is right, then the ‘indisputably clear’ standard—whatever its prior force as precedent—is no longer the governing test.” What Standard of Review Did the Court Apply
in
Wheaton
College,
RE’S
JUDICATA
(July
5,
2014)
at
http://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/07/05/what-standard-of-reviewdid-the-court-apply-in-wheaton-college/ (also noting four other possibilities, and
observing that “all of this is speculation”).
37 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (quoting
New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). See Application to Stay Mandate Pending Appeal at 1718, McQuigg v. Bostic, 189 L. Ed. 2d 884 (2014) (No. 14A196).
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that case it might have been conceded by the four dissenters, but again it is hard to tell.38
The lower courts are apparently having a hard time
telling too. Consider the very recent litigation over Wisconsin’s voter-identification law in the Seventh Circuit:
Two sets of opinions disputed whether the court should
grant a stay. A panel of the court specifically pointed to
the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage stays as evidence of “the public interest” supporting a stay.39 The
panel did not even mention irreparable injury. The citation of the same-sex marriage stays seemed to operate as
a substitute.
An opinion for five judges dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc pointed out that the panel had ignored irreparable-injury requirement, even though the
Supreme Court had elsewhere called it one of the two

38 Compare Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott,
134 S. Ct. 506 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The dissent does not quarrel with that
conclusion either.”); with id. at 507 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (not discussing that passage, but contrasting the “permanent” harms to the plaintiffs with the state’s).
39 Frank v. Walker, 769 F. 3d 494 (2014) (per curiam). The stay was subsequently
vacated by the Supreme Court “pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari,” over the dissent of three Justices and with no explanation. Frank v. Walker, 190 L. Ed. 2d (2014).
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“most critical” stay factors.40 As for the same-sex marriage stays, the dissent explained:

The uncertainty, confusion, and long-term harm
that would result from allowing thousands of
marriages that are valid for a time but might later
be wiped away led to the stays in those cases.41
But this passage did not cite an explanation by the
Court — because there has not been any. Both sides of
the en banc dispute were treating Supreme Court orders
as quasi-precedential. But it is difficult for lower courts
to follow the Supreme Court’s lead without an explanation of where they are being led.
Not only are we often ignorant of the Justices’ reasoning, we often do not even know the votes of the orders
with any certainty. While Justices do sometimes write or
note dissents from various orders, they do not always
note a dissent from an order with which they disagree.
Justice Ginsburg recently told us, ‘‘when a stay is de-

40 Id. (dissent from denial of rehearing en banc, Sept. 30, 2014) at 12 (citing Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435-436 (2009)).
41 Id. at 13.
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nied, it doesn’t mean we are in fact unanimous.”42 And
in a recent summary reversal decision, Justice Alito
wrote: “The granting of a petition for plenary review is
not a decision from which Members of this Court have
customarily registered dissents, and I do not do so
here.”43 This makes it hard for outside observers to conclude that the failure to dissent necessarily signals
agreement with the majority course.
When combined with the minimal explanations for
these rulings, the result is a Court in which we know
very little about what the individual Justices think about
their own procedures. For instance, in the Wheaton College episode, the Court first issued a temporary injunction for several days to have the issue fully briefed44 before issuing the second injunction discussed above. Justice Sotomayor noted a dissent from both orders. Justice
Breyer noted a dissent from the first and not the second.

42

Mark Sherman, Justices’ silence after votes on executions underscores contrast,
ASSOCIATED
Press
(Aug.
4,
2014),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/08/03/justices-silent-over-uselethal-injection/bxqqmUd8npBt0RNPxIPAYO/story.html. Cf. Elena Kagan, Remarks
Commemorating Celebration 55: The Women's Leadership Summit, 32 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 233, 236 (2009) (discussing un-noted dissents from 1876 order denying Belva
Lockwood admission to the Supreme Court bar).
43 Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring); Ohio v. Price,
360 U.S. 246, 250 (1959) (various opinions). But see, e.g., Spears v. United States, 555
U.S. 261, 268 (2009) (noting that “Justice Kennedy would grant the petition for a writ
of certiorari and set the case for oral argument” and that “Justice Thomas dissents”).
44 134 S. Ct. 2898 (2014).
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Justices Kagan and Ginsburg noted a dissent from the
second and not the first. None of Breyer, Ginsburg, or
Kagan wrote anything explaining why they treated the
orders differently, and given Justice Ginsburg’s recent
statement, we cannot even tell whether all of them did.
C. AN ASSESSMENT
The previous observations about the Court’s procedural irregularity are not meant as an indictment. Nor
do I mean to suggest that the Court’s orders should all
attempt to duplicate the regular process of merits consideration and adjudication. When acting on the orders
docket the Court faces important constraints.
First, there is the time constraint. The merits cases
proceed at the Court’s chosen pace. The only two time
pressures are the Court’s self-imposed start-of-summer
deadline for finishing the Term’s work, and the general
scarcity of the Court’s attention, famously charted by
Henry Hart. 45 The orders list, by contrast, often faces
stronger time pressure. In some cases the question is
part of an ongoing case whose schedule might be de-

45 Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84
(1959).
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layed. In other cases the very question is whether the
Court should pause proceedings in the lower courts, so
taking too long to decide is a de facto decision. And
some cases involve external deadlines in the outside
world — elections, executions, fire sales, etc. So it is not
objectionable that the Court sometimes trades procedural regularity for speed.46
Second, it may not be possible to have a fully prescribed set of procedures for orders. The orders sometimes respond to unexpected or unusual developments
in a given case, and the nature of the unexpected is that
it is hard to prepare for it in advance. For all the reasons
that standards are sometimes preferable to rules, some
of the orders ultimately come down to non-codified discretion.
The Court’s general taciturnity may reflect responsibility in light of its awareness of these constraints. In the
merits cases, the Justices can make thoughtful, wellconsidered choices. When they can’t do that on the orders list, perhaps they at least want to make as few
waves as possible, while minimizing the long-term sys-

46 See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 421 (2009) (“‘No court can make time stand
still’ while it considers an appeal, and if a court takes the time it needs, the court's
decision may in some cases come too late for the party seeking review.”) (quoting
Scripps–Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9 (1942)).
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temic consequences of thoughtlessness. 47 Taciturnity
helps draw our eyes away from the orders and towards
the long, reasoned merits opinions where the Court’s
confidence may be higher.
All that said, some critical analysis is warranted. For
instance, even if there is no change to any of the orders
procedures, a comparison might nonetheless make us
more skeptical of certain proposals to reform the merits
procedures.
Reformers sometimes argue that we should have a
less ego-driven court — one in which the Justices spend
less time guarding their own public image or worrying
about personal consistency, and more time as anonymous contributors to the institutional Court.48 The current practice of the orders list provides a glimpse of
what such a reform would look like to the outside
world.49

47 Thanks to Richard Re for emphasizing this point. For a discussion of the Court’s
ability to avoid the merits, see Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). For a discussion of its ability to avoid making law even
when it reaches the merits, see Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 101 (1996).
48 Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court's Cult of Celebrity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1276-1283 (2010); James Markham, Against Individually Signed Judicial Opinions, 56 DUKE L.J. 923 (2006); for a contrary view, see Ira P.
Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1242 (2012).
49 Robert Post has also shown that there were stronger norms against publicizing
dissents during the Taft Court. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion As Institution-
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On the basis of that glimpse, I think there is much to
be said in favor of individual accountability. As a theoretical matter, it is not necessarily possible for the Court
to display perfect consistency across cases, but it is possible to ask “each Justice to develop a principled jurisprudence and to adhere to it consistently.”50 And as a
practical matter, the orders list suggests that when individual personalities, and therefore individual reputations, are taken out of the Court’s practice, the results
might not always be as thoughtful.
Indeed, we have confirmation of this practical point
from the Justices themselves. When Justice Ginsburg
was still Judge Ginsburg she wrote that “[d]isclosure of
votes and opinion writers . . . serves to hold the individual judge accountable” and “puts the judge’s conscience
and reputation on the line.” 51 Similarly, Justice Scalia
has noted the effect of individual accountability on the
Justices: “Even if they do not personally write the majority or the dissent, their name will be subscribed to the
one view or the other. They cannot, without risk of pub-

al Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1267, 1309-1328 (2001) (discussing abandoned practice of “silent acquiescence”
in merits opinions).
50 Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 832
(1982).
51 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 140
(1990).
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lic embarrassment, meander back and forth — today
providing the fifth vote for a disposition that rests upon
one theory of law, and tomorrow providing the fifth
vote for a disposition that presumes the opposite.”52
And if the Justices are right about the effect of individual accountability in the merits cases, maybe there is
something to be said for a little more accountability in
the orders too. Even if the orders cannot and should not
attempt to imitate full dress merits opinions, maybe they
shouldn’t always come out naked. For instance, the
Court could move toward a norm of more transparency
about the votes. It could also provide explanations for
some of its more noteworthy actions. For instance, when
the Court acts to reverse the decision of a court below, or
acts over a Justice’s published dissent, it could provide
at least a brief explanation of the point of disagreement.53

52 Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 SUP. CT. HIST. J. 33, 43 (1994). This is
not to say that judges should never change their minds over the course of their career. See Justin Driver, Judicial Inconsistency As Virtue: The Case of Justice Stevens, 99
GEO. L.J. 1263, 1270-1274 (2011); accord Scalia, supra this note, at 43-44. But they
shouldn’t “meander” from day to day, or at least ought to explain themselves if they
do. Id. at 43.
53 A dissent might also provide occasion for all of the Justices to disclose whether
they agree with the majority. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I., sec. 5, cl. 3, which allows a fifth of
a House to require the “yeas and nays . . . on any question” to “be entered on the
journal.” For more general discussion of such “submajority voting rules,” see ADRIAN
VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY 85-113 (2007).
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The need for improvement is not urgent, but it is
nagging. It would be far too hasty to say that the orders
decisions are thoughtless or the result of unjustified inconsistency. But the Court could do more to reassure us
that they are not.
II. THE SUMMARY REVERSAL DOCKET
One of the more momentous occurrences on the
Court’s orders list are its summary reversals. These are
orders issued in response to petitions for certiorari: Rather than follow the typical course of granting the petition and scheduling the case for briefing and oral argument, the Court will simultaneously grant the petition
and decide the case on the merits, dispensing with further procedure. Unlike the merits opinions, they are not
announced from the bench by their author (and are generally per curiam).
These orders raise different questions of transparency and consistency. Summary reversals have become a
regular part of the Court’s practice, and the Court generally provides reasoned explanations for its decision to
reverse. But the 2013 Term raises questions about why
particular cases are selected for the Court’s attention in
the first place.
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A. REGULARIZING SUMMARY REVERSALS
The summary reversal has come a long way. Sixty
years ago, Professor Albert Sacks’s brief foreword for
the Harvard Law Review expressed tentative misgivings
about the Court’s summary reversal practice and suggesting it deserved further study. 54 A few years later,
Professor Ernest Brown’s own foreword was entirely
devoted to criticizing the enterprise of summary reversal
on grounds of procedural irregularity. 55 Brown noted
that the Court’s then-current rules and practices “all militate to foreclose a comprehensive statement of the merits, even in compressed form.”56 Looking at the pattern
of recent summary reversals from the Court he also concluded that many of them were not obvious enough to
justify reversal, and criticized the Court’s failure to explain its rulings.57 He suggested that the Court reverse
only after ordering supplemental merits briefing, and
preferably after hearing oral argument.58

54 Albert M. Sacks, Foreword, 68 HARV. L. REV. 96, 103 (1954). This was of course
the year of Brown v. Board of Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to which Sacks
devoted just over three of his seven pages. Some of the Court’s summary reversals
were desegregation cases, but by no means all.
55 Ernest J. Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1957).
56 Id. at 80.
57 Id. at 82, 90. Many of the decisions were tax cases.
58 Id. at 94-95.
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In his own Harvard Law Review foreword two
years later, Henry Hart called Brown’s piece “devastating.” 59 The leading Supreme Court practice treatise
picked up on the criticisms too and repeatedly advocated that the Court curtail the procedure of summary reversal.60
Yet the summary reversal practice has not ceased,
and wholesale criticism is fading. The current edition of
Supreme Court Practice collects dissenting opinions that
criticize summary reversal; nearly all of them are by Justices who are no longer on the Court.61 Indeed, the current edition of the treatise now concedes that “there appears to be agreement that summary disposition is appropriate to correct clearly erroneous decisions of lower
courts.”62

Hart, supra note 45, at 88.
See the succession of criticisms in Robert L. Stern & Eugene Gressman, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 185-189 (2nd ed. 1962); Robert L. Stern & Eugene Gressman,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 222-224 (4th ed. 1969); Robert L. Stern & Eugene Gressman, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 363-367 (5th ed. 1978) and Robert L. Stern, Eugene
Gressman & Stephen M. Shapiro, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 280-287 (6th ed. 1986),
culminating eventually in SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 350-357.
61 Of the dozens of citations in SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 350357, the three dissenting opinions written by current Justices are Presley v. Georgia,
558 U.S. 209, 216 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261,
268 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Watts v. United States, 519 U.S. 148, 172 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). None of the three notes anything more than that the particular case at issue didn’t seem clear cut to that dissenter.
62 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 352.
59
60
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Instead, the Court has worked to regularize it,
and the modern practice is not subject to the same objections as the old one. The summary reversal is no longer
completely unexpected. The Supreme Court’s rules now
explicitly discuss the possibility of “summary disposition on the merits.”63 The leading Supreme Court treatise warns advocates at length about the possibility that
the Court will summarily reverse based on the certiorari
papers. 64 The sheer practice of summarily reversing a
handful of cases every year creates a tradition that
makes the practice not unexpected.
And the old practice had been of one-line opinions
without reasoning—“of opinions that do not opine and
of per curiam orders that quite frankly fail to build the
bridge between the authorities they cite and the results
they decree.”65 Yet the Court now summarily reverses in
written opinions that explain their reasoning. These ex-

63 SUP. CT. R. 16.1 (“After considering the documents distributed under Rule 15,
the Court will enter an appropriate order. The order may be a summary disposition
on the merits.”). The rule was adopted in 1980. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note
20, at 343.
64 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 357 (“A respondent concerned over
the possibility of a summary disposition is well advised to concisely demonstrate
that the decision below is correctly decided, in addition to explaining why the case is
not ‘certworthy.’”).
65 Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957).
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planations guide the litigants and enable the Court’s
reasoning to be judged.
This is not to say that the practice of summary reversal is now free from controversy, or even that it
should be. Even now, for instance, there are procedural
wrinkles: It remains quite obscure how many votes are
actually needed to summarily reverse.66 And the Court
sometimes summarily reverses without ever receiving
the record from the lower court.67
Scholars also continue to criticize individual summary reversals or small classes of them as unjustified
given the specifics of the case.68 But even taking these
criticisms at face value, the controversies have focused
on a relatively small portion of the Court’s summary reversal docket.
The 2013 Term suggests that it may be time to look at
the entirety of the cases selected for summary reversal.

66 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE suggests that “[F]ive Justices” may “decid[e] a case
summarily over four dissents that certiorari be denied.” Supra note 20, at 343. But a
rule or convention “may prevent five Justices from deciding a case summarily if the
Court is unanimous that certiorari should be granted but four believe that the cause
should be fully briefed and argued.” Id. at 344.
67 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 350-351. For a recent example, see
Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (Nov. 4, 2013), whose docket is available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-1217.htm.
68 Alex Hemmer, Courts As Managers: American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock and
Summary Disposition at the Roberts Court, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 209, 219-223 (2013);
Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (2012).
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B. SUMMARY REVERSALS IN THE 2013 TERM
In the 2013 Term there were five summary reversals.69 The number is fairly typical. I read through all of
the summary reversals in the nine full terms of the Roberts Court so far and tallied 56 — an average of 6.2 per
year.70 Compared to the thousands of petitions for certiorari presented each year, and even the seventy-some
merits cases per year, these represent a very select
group.
But how are they selected? Two different decisions
cast new light on a separate question. Even assuming
that a particular decision meets the substantive criteria
for error, when should the Court summarily reverse it?

69 They are Williams v. Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (July 1, 2014); Martinez v. Illinois,
134 S. Ct. 2070 (May 27, 2014), Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (May 5, 2014), Hinton
v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (Feb. 24, 2014), and Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3 (Nov. 4,
2013). I do not include in this total the more numerous “GVR” orders in which the
Court grants, vacates, and remands a petition for reconsideration in light of new
precedent, since those orders are a docket-management device, not an adjudication
on the merits. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, The Supreme Court’s Second Thoughts:
Remands for Reconsideration and Denials of Review in Cases Held for Plenary Decisions, 11
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5 (1983). But I do include summary-reversal-like decisions
which vacate rather than reverse after identifying an error in the decision below, e.g.,
Williams, supra, and Tolan, supra. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 510
(Dec. 2, 2013) (not listed) was an edge case that is closer to a GVR.
70 Appendix A.
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1. Tolan v. Cotton
Consider Tolan v. Cotton, a civil rights lawsuit for the
wrongful use of deadly force. The Fifth Circuit had
granted summary judgment to the defendant officers,
and the Supreme Court summarily ruled that the Fifth
Circuit had incorrectly applied the summary judgment
standard, remanding the case for reconsideration under
the proper standard. 71 The decision was somewhat
noteworthy on its own because it marked the first time
in ten years that the Court had ruled against a police officer in a qualified immunity case,72 though the decision
did not even conclusively deny qualified immunity, because the issue was left for remand.
What was more noteworthy was Justice Alito’s concurrence in the judgment (joined by Justice Scalia):

The granting of a petition for plenary review is
not a decision from which Members of this Court

134 S. Ct. 1861 (May 5, 2014).
Ten years and a few months earlier, the Court had denied qualified immunity
in Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), and two years before that it had denied qualified immunity in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). Before Hope, the most recent
one I have found is Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
71
72
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have customarily registered dissents, and I do not
do so here. I note, however, that the granting of
review in this case sets a precedent that, if followed in other cases, will very substantially alter
the Court's practice. See, e.g., this Court’s Rule 10
(“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous
factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law”); S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T.
Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme
Court Practice § 5.12(c)(3), p. 352 (10th ed. 2013)
(“[E]rror correction ... is outside the mainstream
of the Court's functions and ... not among the
‘compelling reasons’ ... that govern the grant of
certiorari”).
In my experience, a substantial percentage of the
civil appeals heard each year by the courts of appeals present the question whether the evidence
in the summary judgment record is just enough
or not quite enough to support a grant of summary judgment. The present case falls into that
very large category. There is no confusion in the
courts of appeals about the standard to be applied in ruling on a summary judgment motion,
and the Court of Appeals invoked the correct
standard here. See 713 F.3d 299, 304 (C.A.5 2013).
Thus, the only issue is whether the relevant evi-
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dence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, is sufficient to support a judgment for that party. In the courts of appeals, cases
presenting this question are utterly routine. There
is no question that this case is important for the
parties, but the same is true for a great many other cases that fall into the same category.
On the merits of the case, while I do not necessarily agree in all respects with the Court's characterization of the evidence, I agree that there are
genuine issues of material fact and that this is a
case in which summary judgment should not
have been granted.
I therefore concur in the judgment.73
Justice Alito’s concurrence was thus a critique of the
Court’s criteria for summary reversal. The fact that a decision is indeed wrong is not an adequate reason for
summary reversal without something bigger at stake.

73 Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868-69 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
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And remember that the Court’s summary reversal opinions usually explain only why a decision is wrong, not
why the case merited the Court’s attention.
Justice Alito’s opinion is more notable when contrasted with a different opinion joined by the same two
Justices and issued two years earlier. In Cash v. Maxwell,
Justice Scalia wrote a dissent from the denial of certiorari that was joined by Justice Alito. Cash featured an alleged misapplication of the federal habeas standard, rather than of the summary judgment standard, but it was
seemingly subject to the same observation that it should
not be plucked out of the heap for summary reversal.
Not so, Justice Scalia explained:

It is a regrettable reality that some federal judges
like to second-guess state courts. The only way
this Court can ensure observance of Congress’s
abridgement of their habeas power is to perform
the unaccustomed task of reviewing utterly factbound decisions that present no disputed issues
of law. We have often not shrunk from that task,
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which we have found particularly needful with
regard to decisions of the Ninth Circuit.74
Justice Scalia later made a similar observation of
lower-court disregard in a merits opinion for the
Court,75 even if the Court did not explicitly endorse Justice Scalia’s views about the selection of cases for summary reversal.
Continuing the connection, shortly after Tolan, Justices Alito and Scalia again noted a dissent from denial
of certiorari in a habeas case, citing the Tolan concurrence. 76 The apparent implication was that the Court
was being inconsistent in its summary reversal criteria,
engaging in “error correction” in Tolan, but then being
unwilling to do the same thing in a habeas case.

74

Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S. Ct. 611, 616 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (citing eight prior reversals); see also Allen v. Lawhorn, 131 S. Ct. 562 (2010)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
75 E.g., White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1701 (2014) (Scalia, J., for the Court)
(Court below “disregarded the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)—a provision of law
that some federal judges find too confining, but that all federal judges must obey.”).
For an earlier admonition, see Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 780 (2011) (Kennedy, J., for the Court). (“[C]onfidence in the writ [of habeas corpus] and the law it
vindicates undermined, if there is judicial disregard for the sound and established
principles that inform its proper issuance. That judicial disregard is inherent in the
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit here under review.”).
76 Beard v. Aguilar, 134 S. Ct. 1869 (2014).
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This would not be the first time that Justice Alito
played such a game of tit-for-tat. In Arizona v. Gant, the
Supreme Court overruled a prior criminal procedure
precedent over Justice Alito’s strong dissent.77 Later that
term, in Montejo v. Louisiana, Justice Alito joined an opinion that overruled a different criminal procedure precedent.78 He wrote a concurrence criticizing as inconsistent
those dissenters who had joined Gant, suggesting that
while he believed in precedent he did not believe in unilateral disarmament.79
In any event, taking all of their opinions together,
Justices Alito and Scalia appear to be gesturing toward
an account of when the Court ought to summarily reverse erroneous yet “factbound” cases. Their idea seems
to be that summary reversals are warranted in areas of
law where there is an unusual epidemic of lower-court
judges willfully refusing to apply the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the law. And implicit in their votes is
an assertion—true, or not—that there is an epidemic of
pro-habeas willfulness in habeas cases, but not of proofficer willfulness in civil rights suits.

556 U.S. 332 (2009).
556 U.S. 778 (2009).
79 Id. at 779-801. On the unilateral disarmament problem, see generally Joseph Isenbergh, Activists Vote Twice, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 159 (2003).
77
78
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2. Williams v. Johnson
The Court’s final opinion of the term was another
summary reversal that was pure ad hoc error correction.
The case was Williams v. Johnson, a habeas case that had
been before the Court once before. 80 In the previous
round the Ninth Circuit had reversed a California state
court conviction on habeas. 81 While AEDPA normally
precludes de novo review of state convictions, the Ninth
Circuit had found that AEDPA’s standard did not apply,
and that without deference the conviction was unlawful.
(The constitutional question was whether the trial judge
had improperly dismissed a juror because he seemed
sympathetic to the defense.)
In that previous round of review, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit in a 16-page opinion for the
Court, written by Justice Alito and joined by every Justice except Scalia, who concurred in the judgment.82 The
opinion held that the Ninth Circuit had been wrong to

80 134 S. Ct. 2659 (July 1, 2014). As with many of the other orders I mention here, I
previously wrote several blog posts about Williams as it was happening. One of
those posts was cited in the briefing. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1. Williams v. Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014) (No. 13-9085).
81 Williams v. Cavazos, 646 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2011).
82 Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013).
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review the conviction de novo, and that AEDPA applied. It did not discuss the underlying merits of the
case, which would normally allow the Ninth Circuit to
reconsider the case under the proper standard — except
for one sentence in the introduction of the opinion,
which summarized the holding thus:

Applying this rule in the present case, we hold
that the federal claim at issue here (a Sixth
Amendment jury trial claim) must be presumed
to have been adjudicated on the merits by the
California courts, that this presumption was not
adequately rebutted, that the restrictive standard
of review set out in §2254(d)(2) consequently applies, and that under that standard respondent is not
entitled to habeas relief.83
The rest of the opinion went on to explain why the
claim should be presumed to be adjudicated on the merits, why the presumption was not rebutted, and why the
restrictive standard of review applied. It never again ex-

83

Id. at 1092 (emphasis added).
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plained why, or even mentioned that, the respondent
should lose under that standard.
That produced a puzzle. Ms. Williams filed a rehearing petition to clarify the issue, which was summarily
denied as almost all rehearing petitions are.84 When the
Ninth Circuit panel got the case back it issued a per curiam opinion “taking note of the denial of a petition for
rehearing on April 15, 2013,” and affirming the district
court’s denial of the habeas petition. 85 The two active
judges on the case, Judge Reinhardt and Chief Judge
Kozinski, each wrote separate opinions explaining that
they felt bound by the unexplained clause of the Court’s
opinion but hoped to be reversed by the Court.86
Happily, the Court obliged. After considering Ms.
Williams cert. petition over the latter part of the Term,
the Court started its summer break with a one paragraph order implying that the clause should not be followed:

133 S. Ct. 1858 (2013).
Williams v. Johnson, 720 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2013).
86 Id. at 1214 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“uncomfortable as I am with that result . .
.”); id. (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (“I hope I’m wrong . . . I take comfort in knowing
that, if we are wrong, we can be summarily reversed.”).
84
85
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The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are
granted. The judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and
the case is remanded for consideration of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim under the standard set forth in 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).87
While that decision can only be described as a very
narrow form of fact-bound error correction, no Justice
publicized a dissent. Of course, we do not know whether that means the decision was in fact unanimous. 88 But
there are justifications for the summary reversal in Williams that even Justices Scalia and Alito might have been
able to agree with.
In Tolan, Justice Alito observed that a “very large category” of petitions to the Courts alleged a similar kind
of error. Thus, the summary reversal in that case would
“very substantially alter the Court’s practice” if repeated.
By contrast, in Williams the claimed error was inherently a rare one. It was a claim bound up with the fact
that the case had been to the Court once before. The

87
88

Williams v. Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014) (per curiam).
See supra nn.42-43 and accompanying text.
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claim, effectively, was that either (1) the Court had made
a mistake by including that language in its opinion, or
(2) the court of appeals had made a mistake in thinking
that language was binding. (The third possibility, of
course, was that the Court had meant to include the language and meant it to be binding; that possibility would
have resulted in a denial of the claim.)
Asserted errors on remand from the Court’s own
cases are a much smaller category, by sheer force of the
Court’s small docket. And it makes sense for the Court
to take a special interest in them. Indeed, Justice Souter
had written that “this Court has a special interest in ensuring that courts on remand follow the letter and spirit
of our mandates.”89 Moreover, since the Court’s opinion
was what introduced the confusion, the Court may have
seen itself as responsible for correcting it.
C. ASSESSING THE SUMMARY REVERSAL DOCKET
The Court does not tell us why it picks cases for
summary reversal. Some incomplete guidance is given
by the Court’s rules. Summary reversal is technically a

89 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1311 (1994) (Souter, J., in chambers) (citing In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255–256 (1895)).
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form of certiorari and the Court’s own Rule 10 lists three
general criteria for certiorari. Several of the criteria involve splits between federal and state courts and are not
generally applicable to the cases that come up for summary reversal. Two others may encapsulate many summary reversals — that a lower court has decided a case
in conflict with Supreme Court precedent, or that a federal court has done something so irregular as to warrant
the Court’s “supervisory power.” But even then, Rule 10
also notes that these criteria are “neither controlling nor
fully measuring the Court’s discretion.” 90 And in any
event, it is not pellucid how those criteria shake out.
Supreme Court Practice just gives up, opining that
“[i]t is difficult to perceive any trend in the behavior of
the Roberts’ Court in this realm.” 91 In order to see
whether this is so, I compiled a list of all of the summary
reversals issued in the first nine terms of the Roberts
Court, with the subject matter and identity of the prevailing party.92 In fact, I think some patterns can be discerned, though I am not sure that they can be completely
explained or defended.

SUP CT. R. 10.
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 351 n.108.
92 See generally Appendix A.
90
91
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1. Summary Reversal as a Tool of Hierarchy
First consider Rule 10’s criterion that “a state
court or a United States court of appeals . . . has decided
an important federal question in a way that conflicts
with relevant decisions of this Court.” 93 Many of the
Court’s summary reversals appear to be designed to ensure that lower courts follow Supreme Court precedents.
The implicit theory of Justices Alito and Scalia’s
opinions in Tolan and Cash is one example. Recall that
their basic idea is that the Court summarily reverses an
unusual number of state-on-top habeas cases because
the lower courts are engaged in a campaign to nullify
the Court’s interpretation of AEDPA. Observers have
also supplied the same interpretation of the Court’s
practice.94
Other examples have been hinted at in recent
scholarship. For instance, in a recent article Professor
Alison Siegler argues that the “federal courts of appeals
have rebelled against every Supreme Court mandate
that weakens the United States Sentencing Guide-

SUP. CT. R. 10 (c).
Recent Case, 126 HARV. L. REV. 860, 866 (2013) (Court’s conduct “increasingly
resembles a concerted campaign against the circuit”); James J. Duane, Sherlock Holmes
and the Mystery of the Pointless Remand, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 154, 169-70 (2013).
93

94
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lines.” 95 Siegler also notes several reversals and summary reversals by the Court on sentencing issues that
suggest that the Court is aware of and has stopped such
rebellions in the past. Providing evidence of further intransigence in the lower courts, she urges the Court to
“step in . . . and stop this latest rebellion.”96
Similarly, Professor Christopher Drahozal notes a
“relatively large number of summary reversals in arbitration cases” from the Supreme Court that engage in
fact-specific error correction.97 He attributes this in part
to “ongoing resistance to the Court’s arbitration decisions in the lower courts.”98
Looking at the entire body of Roberts Court’s
summary reversals seems to confirm these examples. Of
the 56 summary reversals, there were sixteen state-ontop summary reversals in AEDPA cases — the highest
number of cases in any specific category. And there
were several other categories that recurred at least three
times (i.e. at least 5% of the total). Two of these categories are the ones named by Siegler and Drahozal: Booker
sentencing cases, which featured three summary rever-

95 Alison Siegler, Rebellion: The Courts of Appeals’ Latest Anti-Booker Backlash, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), at 1, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2484762.
96 Id. at 15.
97 Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction and the Supreme Court's Arbitration
Docket, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2014).
98 Id.
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sals in a single term, and arbitration cases, which featured three pro-arbitration summary reversals over the
Roberts Court’s tenure.
There are two other three-peating categories: progovernment summary reversals in Fourth Amendment
cases brought under the federal civil rights statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (of which there are three), and state-on-top
summary reversals in habeas cases that do not involve
AEDPA (of which there are six). I am not aware of similar allegations that the lower courts have been resistant
to the Supreme Court’s mandates in these areas, but the
Court’s repeated interest in them might well suggest
that it believes there is such resistance.
In addition to the areas where the Court returns
to the same issue repeatedly, there are several other
summary reversals that appear to be designed to enforce
the Supreme Court’s supremacy in a more case-specific
sense. One such example was Williams v. Johnson, mentioned above. Two other summary reversals, like Williams, had been to the Court at least once before.
In another decision, Eberhart v. United States, the lower court was praised for having ruled the other way. It
had followed outdated Supreme Court precedent because the Court instructs lower courts that only the
Court has the power to recognize when its prior precedents have become outdated. And in Western Tradition
Partnership v. Montana, the Court summarily reversed
the Montana Supreme Court’s attempt to distinguish the
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controversial and recent decision in Citizens United v.
FEC. Those cases are probably hierarchy-maintenance as
well. Together, all of these cases add up to well more
than half (35/56) of the Roberts Court’s summary reversal docket.
In the same spirit, it is also possible that judicial reputation affects the summary reversal docket. Consider
Justice Scalia’s comment that the Court had to police the
Ninth Circuit with special care.99 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit is by far the most frequent entrant on the summary
reversal docket, appearing 18 times and making up almost a third of the docket. The next most frequently target of summary reversal is the Sixth, appearing six
times. More than half (10) of the Ninth Circuit cases
were state-on-top petitions in habeas cases. Every single
one of the Sixth Circuit cases was as well.
There is some information at a more granular level
too.100 The Ninth Circuit has 29 full-time judges, but two
judges appear on the summary reversal docket over and
over and over again. They are Judge Stephen Reinhardt,
appearing ten times, and Judge Kim Wardlaw, appear-

99 Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S. Ct. 611 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
100 See generally Appendix B.
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ing seven. No other judge joined a summarily reversed
panel more than three times.101
Judge Reinhardt’s presence is probably no surprise
to careful court-watchers: Seventeen years ago, Judge
Reinhardt was quoted as saying of the Supreme Court
that “they can’t catch em all,” and as reporting that he
believes that he is the subject of special scrutiny from the
Court—and understandably, given that quote.102 My table suggests that neither Judge Reinhardt nor the Court
have changed. Judge Wardlaw’s relationship with the
Court has not yet been the subject of such extensive public commentary.
There are also three judges whose names appear
repeatedly in another column — the column of those
who dissent from decisions that are then summarily reversed. They are Judge O’Scannlain, whose dissents
presaged three summary reversals in the Ninth Circuit,
and Judge Siler, who dissented in four of the six sum-

101 The other judges appearing exactly three times are Judge Merritt from the Sixth
Circuit, Judges Pregerson and Schroeder from the Ninth Circuit, Judges Wilson and
Tjoflat from the Eleventh Circuit, and maybe Judges Bauer and Williams from the
Seventh Circuit, depending on whether one double-counts Corcoran, a single case
that was summarily reversed twice by the Court in two separate trips. Id.
102 Matt Rees, The Judge the Supreme Court Loves to Overturn, THE WEEKLY
STANDARD
(May
5,
1997),
http://www.theweeklystandard.com/content/public/articles/000/000/001/414ily
ss.asp. See also M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1029 n.15
(2010) (calculating Judge Reinhardt’s reversal rate).
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mary reversals in the Sixth Circuit. No other dissenter
appears more than once.103
I do not mean to make too much of these particular names. For instance, the fact that Judge Reinhardt’s
name appears frequently does not mean he is a bad
judge. Maybe other judges make the same rulings as he
does, but are given more of the benefit of the doubt. Just
as the Supreme Court has been said to be “infallible because it is final” and not the other way around, 104 perhaps Judge Reinhardt seems wayward because he is frequently reversed, rather than being frequently reversed
because he is wayward. And of course that is putting
aside the bigger question about whether lower court
judges may or should defy the Supreme Court when
they disagree with it.
More generally, to put these names in context one
would also want to normalize by size and perhaps type
of docket and many other factors.105 But a focus on the
orders list could still add an important nuance to the
study of which lower-court judges are in repeated dialogue with the Court; even if other judges appear before

103 See Appendix B. Out of economy, I did not include subsequent non-panel dissents, such as decisions respecting the denial of en banc review.
104 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
105 Judith Resnik, Reading Reinhardt: The Work of Constructing Legal Virtue (Exempla
Iustitiae), 120 YALE L.J. 539, 564-565 (2010).
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the Court with similar regularity,106 some judges may be
treated by the Court in unusually summary fashion.
And for present purposes, this sheds at least some light
on the patterns in the Supreme Court’s summary reversal docket.
2. Summary Reversal as Ad Hoc Prerogative
What about the other cases? I have listed the subject matter and the victor in the appendix, but I find it
hard to generalize them apart from the category “other.”
Many of them are one-off summary reversals vindicating a criminal defendant, in areas such as doublejeopardy (Martinez v. Illinois), public-trial (Presley v.
Georgia), or Brady (Youngblood v. West Virginia). Interestingly, each of those examples has been criticized by observers as not meeting the traditional summary reversal
criteria.107 Several of the remaining decisions also contain published dissents, and it is possible that such dis-

106 Id. at 561-563 (noting that “Judge Reinhardt is one of is one of several judges
who are repeat players before the Supreme Court, and many have similarly high
numbers of cases reviewed during the brief period”).
107 See Hemmer, supra note 68, at 217-218, 220-221 (criticizing Youngblood and Presley); Richard Re, Did the Martinez Sum Rev Apply or Change the Law?, RE’S JUDICATA
(June 6, 2014), at http://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/did-themartinez-sum-rev-apply-or-change-the-law/ (criticizing Martinez).
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sents help ensure a case gets singled out for special attention. Perhaps the Court is particularly likely to intervene when it thinks the correct answer was staring the
lower court in the face.108 But many of the summary reversals do not contain dissents, and most dissents do not
become summary reversals.
Even once one crosses off the Ninth Circuit cases,
the habeas cases and other categories mentioned above,
and the cases with dissents, there still remain more than
a dozen summary reversals that don’t fit into any obvious pattern.
So what more can one say about this residual category? One might say that these reversals are in the spirit of Rule 10’s criterion that a “United States court of appeals . . . has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a
departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of
this Court’s supervisory power.”109 They are not all in
keeping with its letter, since many of them feature state
courts, not a “United States court of appeals.” But the
general idea may simply be that sometimes a court has
done something wrong in an unusual way that defies
generalization.

108
109

Thanks to Justin Driver for this point.
SUP. CT. R. 10 (a).
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These kinds of summary reversals might express
the need for a safety valve from general rules. Professor
John Harrison has noted that the executive’s pardon
power is one example of this prerogative. “By and
large,” he writes, “governments do good through rules
and not outside them.” 110 And yet “no rule or set of
rules captures practical wisdom.”111 Pardons attempt to
supply occasional wisdom or mercy while leaving the
rest of the system intact:

They should be like lightning bolts, relatively rare
and in principle hard to predict because their incidence, although chosen on a reasoned basis,
cannot be accounted for in advance by the imperfect approximations of reality on which legal
rules are based.112
The function of the prerogative need not be limited
to the executive branch. The same function has been attributed to equity, though by the sixteenth century equi-

John Harrison, Pardon as Prerogative, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 147 (2001).
Id.
112 Id.
110
111
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ty was no longer a series of lightning bolts, 113 and scholars who advocate equity as a safety valve do not necessarily intend for it to be rare.114
Perhaps this portion of the Court’s summary reversal docket operates like Harrison’s prerogative. A
pardon, of course, is a decision to depart from the law,
while a summary reversal is a decision to enforce it. But
the decision to pick a case for summary reversal is a discretionary certiorari decision. Those decisions are rare
and hard to predict, but we hope they are made on a
reasoned basis nonetheless.
3. Questions of Agenda Selection
Both of these visions, and especially their combination, raise questions of procedural regularity, but they
are not the questions usually raised by summary reversal critics. The point is not that the parties lack adequate
notice of the Court’s practices. Nor is the point that the
individual summary reversals are unjustified or insuffi-

See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 125-126 (2008).
Kenneth Ayotte, Ezra Friedman, and Henry E. Smith, A Safety Valve Model of
Equity as Anti-Opportunism, (unpublished draft Mar. 30, 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2245098. Thanks to Sam Bray
for these points.
113
114
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ciently clear. Rather, the point is that agenda selection is
important, but the Court’s criteria here are not explained
and may not be fully thought through.
Think of the other miscellaneous orders discussed
in Part I, where we do not know why the Court is doing
what it’s doing, and do not even know whether the
Court agrees on a single view or rationale. Summary reversals are more transparent in an important sense: they
tell us why the lower court was wrong. But nonetheless,
they do not tell us why this lower-court error was singled out for judicial attention.
The Court does not reverse every error, or even every clear error, that comes through the door. Maybe it
could: At oral argument last month, Justice Scalia jokingly suggested that “I guess it’s an abuse of discretion
whenever we fail to correct a clear error of law on a petition for certiorari. Right?”115 But Justice Scalia was offering the suggestion sarcastically — it was supposed to be
the absurdum in a reductio ad absurdum.116
If the Court does not reverse every error, then we
return to the question of which classes of error are selected for judicial attention. If I am right that a majority

115
116

ia, J.).

Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Dart Cherokee v Owens, 134 S. Ct. 1788.,
Id. (“I thought we just had the power to say we don’t feel like taking it.”) (Scal-
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of the summary reversal decisions are designed to enforce the Court’s supremacy, then this opens up new
grounds for investigation and debate.
It has been observed that “the current Court’s
disdain for error correction is selective” and seems to
work largely to the detriment of “criminal defendants
and habeas petitioners.”117 The current selection of cases
gives rise to at least two possible interpretations. One is
that the Court spends its resources on “error correction”
when it perceives a rebellion in the lower courts, and it
is unaware of any comparable rebellions in the other
“direction.”118 The more cynical interpretation is that the
Court ignores classes of error that it doesn’t mind or
doesn’t care about.
Further research and identification of these cases
— both by scholars and by lower court judges — could
either change this practice or illuminate the Court’s true
criteria. For instance, are Justices Alito and Scalia correct
in their implicit suggestion that lower courts willfully
resist the Court’s AEDPA precedents but not its civil
rights precedents? And in what other areas might lower
court willfulness currently be going undetected or un-

117 Robert M. Yablon, Justice Sotomayor and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Process,
123 YALE L.J. FORUM 551, 562 (2014).
118 Id. at 563 (suggesting that lower courts be reminded that that “errors in criminal cases can run in both directions”).
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addressed? If one could systematically identify classes of
cases where the lower courts are repeatedly defying the
Supreme Court’s views of the law, then the Court may
either pick up the mantle or reveal that its cases are selected for some other reason.119
That leaves the “lightning bolts.” Here, I am less optimistic that reform is possible, and less pessimistic that
it is necessary. If every individual summary reversal is
in fact an example of clear error it is hard to criticize
them individually. In the moment, it is hard to stand on
a general and abstract principle of regularity when there
is a real manifest error to be corrected. And systematically, they may be the best that we can do.
The ideal Supreme Court would bear little resemblance to Zeus. But a narrow outlet for judicial prerogative — limited to reversing real and clear errors by the
lower courts — may simply be the best practical accommodation of rules and discretion. Our best hope is
that the Court exercises that prerogative thoughtfully
and wisely.

119 For an example of scholarship attempting this, see Shon Hopwood, The Not So
Speedy Trial Act, 89 WASH. L. REV. 709, 744-45 (2014) (advocating summary reversal
on certain speedy trial act issues).
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CONCLUSION
There is a frequent mixed review of the Supreme
Court that goes something like this: Most of the time, in
its low-profile cases, the Court behaves in a professional,
organized, and lawyerly manner. It is just in the hotbutton, high-stakes, sharply divided cases that law runs
out and politics and personal preferences take over. The
Court is at its most orderly and lawyerly when it is less
divided and out of the media spotlight.120
I’m not sure I agree with that assessment of the
hot-button cases, but let us put that aside for another
day. The orders list suggests that if there is a problem at
the Supreme Court, it may be the opposite of the usual
narrative. It is on technical procedural and administrative questions when the spotlight is off that the Court’s
decisions seem to deviate from its otherwise high standards of transparency and legal craft.

120 For versions of this account (each with their own nuances, of course) see, e.g.,
Geoffrey Stone, The Behavior of Supreme Court Justices When Their Behavior Counts The
Most, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY (2013),
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Stone_-_Behavior_of_Justices.pdf. Senator Barack Obama, Remarks on the Confirmation of Judge John Roberts,
http://obamaspeeches.com/031-Confirmation-of-Judge-John-Roberts-ObamaSpeech.htm.
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY REVERSALS IN THE ROBERTS
COURT

Name

Date

Subject

Successful
Petitioner

Williams v.
Johnson*

July 1,
2014

Habeas

Prisoner

Martinez v.
Illinois

May
27,
2014

Double
Defendant
Jeopardy

Tolan v.
Cotton

S. 1983
May 5,
(4th
Plaintiff
2014
Am./QI)

5th Cir.

Hinton v.
Alabama

Feb. 24, Strick2014
land

Ala. Ct.
Crim.
App.

Prisoner

Nevada v.
Jackson

S. 1983
Nov. 4,
(4th
Officer
2013
Am./QI)
June
Habeas
24,
(ProceState
2013
dure)
June 3, Habeas
State
2013
(AEDPA)

Marshall v.
Rodgers

April 1, Habeas
State
2013
(AEDPA)

Nitro-lift
Tech. v.
Howard

Nov.
26,
2012

Stanton v.
Sims
Ryan v.
Schad

Arbitration

Employer

Lower
Court

9th Cir.

Ill. Sup.
Ct.

9th Cir.

9th Cir.

Lower Court
Majority
(author is
bold)
Kozinski,
Reinhardt,
Whyte
Freeman,
Kilbride,
Thomas, Garman, Karmeier, Theis
Barksdale,
Jones, Southwick
Kellum, Windom, Welch,
Burke, Joiner
Reinhardt,
Silverman,
Wardlaw
Reinhardt,
Schroeder,

Dissent

Burke

Graber

Reinhardt,
Goodwin
Murguia
Zouhary, W.
9th Cir. Fletcher, Reinhardt
Watt, Colbert,
Reif, Kauger,
Okla.
Winchester,
Sup. Ct.
Edmondson,
Taylor, Combs,
9th Cir.
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Gurich

Lefemine v.
Wideman

Att’y
Nov. 5, Fees/
2012
Civil
Rights

American
Tradition
Partnership
v. Bullock

June
25,
2012

Parker v.
Matthews
Coleman v.
Johnson

June
11,
2012
May
29,
2012

Campaign
Finance

Ryburn v.
Huff
Hardy v.
Cross
Bobby v.
Dixon
KPMG v.
Cocchi
Cavazos v.
Smith

4th Cir.

Speaker

McGrath,
Mont.
Morris, Cotter, Baker,
Nelson
Sup. Ct. Wheat, and
Rice

Habeas
State
(AEDPA)

6th Cir.

Clay, Moore

Siler

Habeas
State
(AEDPA)

3rd Cir.

Nygaard,
McKee

Chagares

Marmet
Health Care Feb. 21, ArbitraCenter v.
2012
tion
Brown
Wetzel v.
Lambert

Wynn, Duncan, Diaz

Plaintiff

Employer

Feb. 21, Habeas
State
2012
(AEDPA)
S.1983
Jan. 23,
(4th
Officer
2012
Am./QI)
Dec.
Habeas
12,
State
(AEDPA)
2011
Nov. 7, Habeas
State
2011
(AEDPA)
Auditor
Nov. 7, Arbitra(pro2011
tion
arbitration)
Oct. 31, Habeas
State
2011
(AEDPA)

Ketchum,
W.Va.
Workman,
Sup. Ct. McHugh,
Gaujot
Barry, Har3rd Cir. diman, Stapleton
9th Cir.

Marbley,
Kozinski

7th Cir.

Williams,
Kanne, Rovner

6th Cir.

Merritt, Cole

Fla. 4th
DCA

Warner, Polen,
Farmer

9th Cir.

Pregerson,
Canby, Reed

Rawlinso
n

Siler
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United
States v.
Juvenile
Male**
Bobby v.
Mitts
Felkner v.
Jackson
Swarthout
v. Cooke***
(Cooke v.
Solis)
Swarthout
v. Cooke***
(Clay v.
Kane)
Wilson v.
Corcoran*

June
27,
2011 &
June 7,
2010
May 2,
2011
March
21,
2011

9th Cir.

Reinhardt,
Tashima,
McKeown

Habeas
State
(AEDPA)

6th Cir.

Merritt, Martin Siler

Habeas
State
(AEDPA)

9th Cir.

Schroeder,
Rawlinson,
Collins

Mootness

United
States

Habeas
Jan. 24,
(Due
2011
Process)

State

9th Cir.

Reinhardt,
Wardlaw, M.
Smith

Habeas
Jan. 24,
(Due
2011
Process)

State

9th Cir.

Pregerson,
Wardlaw,
Leighton

Habeas
(Misc.)

State

7th Cir.

Bauer, Williams, Sykes

Strickland

Prisoner

11th Cir. Marcus, Tjoflat Carnes

Thaler v.
Haynes

Nov. 8,
2010
May
24,
2010
Feb. 22,
2010

Wilkins v.
Gaddy

Jefferson v.
Upton

59

FOREWORD

Habeas
State
(AEDPA)

5th Cir.

Dennis, Jolly,
Clement

Feb. 22, S.1983
Plaintiff
2010
(8th Am.)

4th Cir.

Motz, Shedd,
Hamilton

Wellons v.
Hall

Habeas
Jan. 19,
(Due
2010
Process)

Prisoner

11th Cir.

Wilson,
Tjoflat, Black

Presley v.
Georgia

Jan. 19, Public
2010
Trial

Prisoner/
Defendant

McDaniel v. Jan. 11, Habeas
State
Brown
2010
(AEDPA)

Hines, Carley,
Ga. Sup. Thompson,
Ct.
Benham, Melton
Wardlaw,
9th Cir.
Hawkins

Sears,
Hunstein
O'Scannla
in
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Michigan v. Dec. 7,
Fisher
2009

4th Am.

Habeas
(Strickland)
Habeas
Wong v.
(StrickBelmontes*
land)
Habeas
Bobby v.
Nov. 9,
(StrickVan Hook
2009
land)
Habeas
Corcoran v. Oct. 20,
(ProceLevenhagen 2009
dure)
June
Habeas
Sears v.
29,
(StrickUpton
2010
land)
Porter v.
McCollum

Nov.
30,
2009
Nov.
16,
2009

State

Talbot,
Mich.
Cavanagh,
Ct. App.
Zahra

Prisoner/
Defendant

11th Cir.

Carnes, Wilson, Pryor

State

9th Cir.

Reinhardt,
Paez

State

6th Cir.

Merritt, Martin, Moore

Prisoner

7th Cir.

Bauer, Sykes

Prisoner

Ga. Trial
Girardeau
Ct.

CSX Transportation v.
Hensley

June 1,
FELA
2009

Railroad

Ct. App.
Susano, Lee,
Tenn
Ogle
(ED)

Nelson v.
United
States

Jan. 26,
Booker
2009

Prisoner

4th Cir.

Spears v.
United
States

Jan. 21,
Booker
2009

Prisoner

8th Cir.

Oct. 14,
Booker
2008

Prisoner

8th Cir.

Loken, Smith,
Gruender

7th Cir.

Evans, Williams

Moore v.
United
States
Wright v.
Van Patten
Allen v.

Jan. 7,
2008

Habeas
State
(AEDPA)

Nov. 5, Habeas

State

O'Scannla
in

Williams

Niemeyer,
Duncan, Hamilton
Riley, Loken,
Wollman,
Murphy,
Melloy, Smith,
Bye, Lay
Colloton,
Gruender,
Benton, Shepherd

11th Cir. Barkett,

Coffey
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Siebert

2007

Erickson v.
Pardus

June 4, S.1983
Plaintiff/
2007
(8th Am.) Prisoner

May
Los Angeles
21,
v. Rettele
2007
Youngblood June
v. West
19,
Virginia
2006

(AEDPA)

Tjoflat, Wilson
Anderson,
10th Cir. O’Brien,
Porfilio

S. 1983
State
(4th Am.)

9th Cir.

Brady

Benjamin,
W.Va.
Albright,
Sup. Ct.
Maynard

Prisoner

JurisdicWhitman v. June 5,
Plaintiff/
tion/Prec
DOT
2006
Employee
lusion
Salinas v.
April
SentencUnited
24,
Prisoner
ing
States
2006

5th Cir.

Davis, Jones,
Garza

6th Cir.

Cole,
Daughtrey

Prisoner

7th Cir.

Flaum, Bauer,
Posner

State

9th Cir.

Canby, Hansen, Rawlinson

State

9th Cir.

Reinhardt,
Thompson,

Ash v.
Tyson

Feb. 21, EmPlaintiff/
2006
ployment Employee

Oct. 17, Habeas
2005
(Misc.)

Wardlaw,
Kleinfeld, Hall

State

ImmigraUnited
tion ProStates
cedure

Foreign
Feb. 21,
Immuni2006
ty
Nov.
Bradshaw v.
Habeas
28,
Richey
(AEDPA)
2005
Eberhart v.
Oct. 31, JurisdicUnited
2005
tion
States****
Kane v.
Oct. 31, Habeas
Espitia
2005
(AEDPA)

9th Cir.

Iran/
United
States

April
17,
2006

Iran v. Elahi

Pregerson,
Thomas

Wardlaw,
Schroeder,
Reinhardt,
9th Cir.
Hawkins, Silverman, Graber, Paez
Dubina,
11th Cir. Carnes, Marcus
B. Fletcher,
9th Cir. Wardlaw,
Fisher

Gonzales v.
Thomas

Schriro v.
Smith
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Cowen
Davis,
Starcher

Rymer,
O'Scannlai
n, Kleinfeld, Bea

Siler
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Ferguson

Dye v.
Hofbauer

Oct. 11, Habeas
2005
(Misc.)

Prisoner

6th Cir.

Daughtrey,
Boggs,
Economus

*Case had previously been decided by Court.
**Case was certified to a state court and Court issued two opinions.
***Two lower court opinions reversed in a single
case.
****Lower court was praised for ruling correctly.
In general, I compiled this list by looking at every
opinion on the Supreme Court’s opinions list for the relevant terms labeled “per curiam” and then reading it to
see whether it was a summary reversal and if so what
the issues were and who won. Per curiam decisions that
were not before the Court on certiorari—for instance
mandatory appeals, and applications for a stay—were
omitted from the list.
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APPENDIX B: LOWER COURT JUDGES AND THE SUMMARY
REVERSAL DOCKET
Judge
Stephen Reinhardt
Kim Wardlaw
Gilbert Merritt
William Bauer
Ann Williams
Harry Pregerson
Mary Schroeder
Gerald Tjoflat
Charles Wilson
Eugene Siler
Diarmud O’Scannlain

Circuit
9th Cir.
9th Cir.
6th Cir.
7th Cir.
7th Cir.
9th Cir.
9th Cir.
11th Cir.
11th Cir.
6th Cir.
9th Cir.

Reviewed Opinions
10
7
3
3*
3* (and a dissent)
3
3
3
3
4 (dissents)
3 (dissents)

*Assuming one counts Wilson v. Corcoran and Corcoran v.
Levenhagen as two separate summary reversals.

Readers with comments may address them to:
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